BOOK REVIEW
BY
1. Introduction
a. Name
of the Book.
|
The War That
Never Was
|
b. Author
|
Ravi Rikhye
|
c. Chapters
|
Eleven
|
d. Pages
|
211
|
e. Published
By
|
Ali Majeed Printers
8-C, Darbar Market, Lahore
|
f. Year
of Publication
|
1998
|
g. Price
|
Not Known
|
h. Quality
of Book
|
-
Hard Binding
-
Average Paper/Printing
|
j. Printed by Army
Education Press or not
|
Yes
|
k. Price of the book
(if known)
|
Not known
|
2. About The Author. The book does not include any information
about Ravi Rikhye. However, as known, he is a reputed Indian writer and a
journalist. Besides many other known books and columns, he also has a famous
book to his credit, “The Fourth Round”. He takes special interest in
international affairs, politics and strategy.
3. Comments on Contents
a.
General Comments on the Book. Though biased, it
is a good work carried out by the
author on the war that never was. The story is about how India, despite its
superior strength, lost the 1987 War That Never Was without firing a shot. It is a comparison of the strength of both
sides, so that the reader can make his or her own judgment about the enormity
of India’s surrender. It is in the same context that the writer has developed
the book.
b.
Chapter 1- Brass Tacks: Events Leading Upto. The
author has explained imperatives of domestic po1icy that led to a situation in
which an incident with Pakistan was necessary to divert attention from the
growing chaos at home. Though, India prepared to create an incident, when the
time came, she let the Pakistan to outmaneuver and backed down. The author also
discusses plans for Operation Trident/Brass
Tacks in general and analysis it critically.
c.
Chapter 2- The Pakistan Army. The
author has gone to minute details while tracing out potentials of Pakistan
Army. Though, the details given are not 100% correct but include an outline
organization of armed forces, deployment, anti-tank missiles, electronic
warfare ability, aviation assets, reserves and paramilitary forces.
d.
Chapter 3-
The Indian Army. The details of Indian Army are covered
briefly on the same lines as that of Pakistan Army.
e.
Chapter 4- How
India Lost All Its War. Analysis of the proposition that war of
1947-48 and 1965 were a favorable stalemate and that of 1971 was an outright
victory has been carried out in this chapter. Here the author comments that in
all security crises, there have been very serious misperceptions of adversary
behavior and that India repeatedly commits same mistake.
f.
Chapter 5- The Lack Of A Red Team. The author has remarked that in strategic
crises and in war games, the red team plays the opponent and that it is led by
weaker personnel which leads to a victory of friendly forces. On the other
hand, once put on ground, the government and the army simply failed to
comprehend Pakistan’s sound reaction resulting in India’s strategic failure.
g.
Chapter 6- Sector Balance. This chapter examines the balance of forces
in each sector and analyses the events of the winter of 1986/87. It deals
deliberately with Northern Kashmir, Southern Kashmir, Pathankot sector, Sialkot
sector, Lahore sector, Multan sector and the Desert sector.
h.
Chapter 7- The Rival Navies. It covers the naval assets of the adversaries
and relates them with the armed forces of both. After a detailed analysis, the
author concludes that both are land powers and that the battle (if any) will be
decided by land forces only.
j. Chapter
8- The Rival Air Forces. It is an
analytical overview of the quantity and quality of both. This chapter also
includes allies to both the countries and establishes the time frame in which
either of the adversary can get outside support in terms of supply of aircrafts
etc.
k. Chapter
9- The Military Balance in the Event of War. In a progressive manner, the author has
pitched the opposing land forces against each other hypothetically basing on
the deployment executed by both sides. He establishes that it was the weak
political link, which forced India to back out; otherwise Pakistan could not
have achieved absolute victory in any sector to dictate the terms for peace.
l. Chapter
10- Why Operation Brass Tacks Would Have Failed. The author dwells upon the problems being
faced by the two sides and then discusses all possible dimensions of Brass
Tacks. The chapter also touches the peripheral aspects of Pakistan’s strategy
against Brass Tacks and too conscious approach of Indian military leadership
towards execution of the offensive. The author comments that in order to
achieve desired results, General Sunderji has to change the entire psychology
of the Indian Army.
m. Chapter
11- Trident. Trident was to be an
attack by Indian XV Corps on Skardu and then Gilgit with the abject of
capturing the Northern Areas of Pakistan. The author analytically discusses the
problems linked with this plan and says that the Indian army planners were
overcome by their concepts of lightening war, thereby, allowing only two weeks
to reach Gilgit via Skardu which was an impossible dream due to incorrect time
calculation.
4. Recommendations.
The book covers war as the only instrument to capture Pakistan and talks of
reintegration, which in any case is not acceptable to the people of Pakistan.
The book is recommended for the students of military history, international
affairs and strategic studies.
5. Conclusion. This book examines Indian ability to achieve an
all out victory over Pakistan in the backdrop of Brass Tacks and Trident. It
leaves no stone unturned to express Indian hegemonic designs and clarifies that
Pakistan Army is a potent and professional force, which has always stood to the
cause. The book mainly gives out the weaknesses in Indian military and political
system in general and leadership in particular. It is therefore a useful source
to know about our enemy and take precautions accordingly.